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Abstract 
The procedure of reliability analysis for gas turbine unit (GTU) cogeneration-type SGT-800 is discussed. The example of 
creating a functional structure and categories of the failures criticality for GTU is provided. The qualitative matrix for GTU 
structural elements analysis is constructed and the criticality values are calculated. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern engineering used a set of standardized methods and procedures for the analysis of industrial equipment 
failures named as Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (hereafter called FMECA). For example, NASA 
adopted this methodology primarily for military aircraft development. FMECA methodology is used for identifying, 
critical priorities and compensating actions to eliminate potential failures in a system, structure or process. An 
important point in FMECA is to identify the functions of equipment and structural elements, which required special 
attention in the design and operation of support. [2,3]. 
FMECA method must be planned and carried out simultaneously with the construction process. In ideal the 
analysis starts at the design stage during structure performance parameters and range of tasks definition. This "top-
down" approach has a functional orientation. The biggest interest is FMECA application for the operated equipment 
where the critical failure analysis helps to build a rational system of maintenance and material supply. 
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2. Experimental 
The cogeneration heat and power gas turbine SGT-800 used at gas turbine power plants was chosen as a study 
subject [4]. For this type of gas turbine functional structure has been created that reflects the list of the main 
functions of the installation and the structural elements responsible for their implementation. First of all, it is 
necessary to identify all the components of the equipment which are relevant for the study. At this point it is 
necessary to identify all the basic functions of the turbine, starting from the most aggregated and finishing with the 
most detailed ones, and associate to every function the physical element which provides that function (Table 1). 
Table 1. Association of all the functions to a single physical element. 
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Translate thermal 
energy into mechanical 
energy 
Address combustion products into turbine’s blades Compressor exit and exit of every pressure level 
of the turbine  
Cool working wheel Air pipe from compressor to turbine, shape and 
inner structure of working wheel  
Control pressure after every step Pressure sensors after every pressure step 
Fixation of working wheel Ties of turbine 
Burn air and fuel   
(Exothermic reaction 
to create heat) 
 Fuel injection Injector, fuel pump 
Air supply Air addressing device 
Inflammation Spark plugs 
Tubes’ cooling Air tubes 
Temperature control in the combustion chamber Temperature sensors 
 Maintaining stable combustion Flue 
Translate mechanical 
energy into electrical 
energy with the 
necessary frequency 
Translate mechanical energy into electricity  Generator 
Low the number of rounds until the necessary level Speed reducer 
Providing connections from PTO to turbine shaft Joint/Gasket 
Air compression Providing connections from compressor shaft to 
turbine shaft 
Compressor ties and wheel 
Air supply to the compressor Inlet nozzle 
Address air to compressor’s blades Entrance to compressor and entrance of every 
pressure step 
Ensure a minimum free space between the rotor and 
the starter 
Compressor’s graphite sealing 
Pressure control after every pressure step Pressure sensors after every step 
Warranty of safe work Fuel filtering from particles Fuel filter 
Construction fixation  Supports 
Clear air supply Air filter 
Control of noize Silencer 
 
The procedure for the qualitative analysis of criticality is to appoint a functional failure with types of corrective 
actions depending on the priorities of the failure probability (Table 2) and the Degree of the Seriousness of the 
Failures (Table 3). 
 
179 A.E. Brom et al. /  Procedia Engineering  152 ( 2016 )  177 – 181 
Table 2. Levels of failure probability and its descriptions. 
Level of failure probability Description 
A Frequent failure: it occurs more than 20% of the plant working time 
B Probable failure: it occurs between 10% and 20% of the plant working time 
C Possible failure: it occurs between 1% and 10% of the plant working time 
D Rare failure: it occurs between 0,1% and 1% of the plant working time 
E Unlikely failure: it occurs less than 0,1% of the plant working time 
Table 3. Degree of the Seriousness of the Failures 
Severity Description 
I Catastrophic failure: it can cause equipment death or destruction. 
II Critical failure: it can cause serious damages to the equipment. 
III Medium failure: it can cause medium sized damages to the equipment 
IV Border line failure: it can cause minor priority injuries or damages to the equipment 
V Slight failure: does not cause injury, not inflicting damage and does not affect execution of the mission, 
but leading to the need for unscheduled maintenance or minor repairs the final product 
 
For all of them the criticality of their impact and the probability of occurrence were identified (Table 4). 
Table 4. Example of some elements characteristics. 
Failure type Occurrence probability  Severity 
Filter clogging В III 
Contamination of compressor’s blades С III 
Abrasion of graphite sealing E V 
Pipe burning А I 
Failure of fuel pump D IV 
Abrasion of the bearing pads E V 
Silencer burning D IV 
Failure of reducer C IV 
Failure of generator C IV 
Contamination of cooling pipes В II 
High-temperature corrosion C II 
 
Having all this information, it is possible to create a matrix combining occurrence probability and criticality level 
of failures, as shown in Table 5, in order to choose the best maintenance strategies for all the groups. 
Table 5. Matrix failure level - criticality level. 
 Severity 
Level of failure 
probability 
V IV III II I 
>0.2     Pipe burning 
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0.1 – 0.2   Filter clogging Contamination 
of cooling pipes 
 
0.01 – 0.1 
 Failure of reducer, 
failure of 
generator 
Contamination of 
compressor 
 blades 
High-
temperature 
corrosion 
 
0.001 – 0.01 
 Air filter, failure 
of fuel pump, 
silencer burning 
  Lubrication 
system 
<0.001 
Abrasion of 
graphite sealing, 
abrasion of the 
bearing pads, 
temperature 
sensors 
  Joint/Gaskets  
 
Then the criticality values of GTU elements are calculated by the following formula [1]: 
ܥ௥ ൌ σ ܥ௠௝௡௝ୀଵ ൌ σ ߣ௜ ൉௡௝ୀଵ ߙ௝ ൉ ߚ௝ ൉ ݐ   (1) 
where ܥ୫୨is criticality value of the number j of the product; ߚ୨is the conditional probability of the loose of the 
systematic mission when the product breaks down as model j; Ƚ୨is the percentage of failure displayed as model j (if 
all the failure models of a product are listed, the totality of Ƚ j would be 1.); λi is the failure probability of element i; 
ݐ is equivalent hours of operating element i. As for a given degree of seriousness and a given phase of mission, Cr is 
the totality of Cmj under this degree of seriousness. The working time t can be calculated from the definition of the 
system. Generally, it is shown by the hours used to finish each mission or by the times of the working circle [1]. 
The destructive degrees of a GTU elements ordered by the degree of seriousness (Table 6) are calculated based 
on the manufacturer statistical data in the equivalent hours of operating time based on load factor and fuel ratio. 
Table 6. The destructive degrees of a GTU elements ordered by the degree of seriousness. 
Severity Element Probability of 
the failure effect 
occurrence 
Percent
age of 
failure  
Failure 
probability 
(1/hour) 
Equivalent 
hours of 
operating (hour) 
Destructive 
degree of a 
product୰ 
I Flue 0.25 1 0.0000167 60 000 0.25 
II Turbocharger coolant supply tube 0.13 1 0.000033 30 000 0.13 
Turbine blades 0.005 1 0.00002 50 000 0.005 
Deflector 0.007 1 0.00002 50 000 0.007 
III Fuel filter  0.15 1 0.0001 10 000 0.15 
High-efficiency air filter 0.15 1 0.0001 10 000 0.15 
First stage air filter 0.15 1 0.000125 8 000 0.15 
Compressor ties and wheel 0.07 1 0.00011 9 000 0.07 
IV Generator 0.01 1 0.000033 30 000 0.01 
Speed reducer 0.01 1 0.000025 40 000 0.01 
Fuel pump 0.008 1 0.00005 20 000 0.008 
Silencer 0.01 1 0.000067 15 000 0.01 
V Compressor’s graphite sealing 0.001 1 0.000018 55 000 0.001 
Joint/Gasket 0.001 1 0.0000125 80 000 0.001 
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3. Conclusions  
The calculated criticality values allow generating a list of items based on GTU failures priority (descending Cr 
values). The manufacturer in accordance with the actual data on the modes of operation and operating time of a 
particular installation by adjusting the intensity of failures can build up an individual GTU plan maintenance. This 
allows saving significantly on the support of the technical operation and material supply the gas turbine power plant. 
Thus, holding FMECA is necessary not only in the design and construction, but for active operation of the 
equipment for a long time. 
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